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Abstract 
A worrying feature of Akerlof’s (1970) model is that the existence of sufficiently many 
products of relatively low quality (“lemons”) in a market may not only drive those of high 
quality out of the market, but it may even “…drive the market out of existence” (p. 495). We 
discuss a two-sided market framework with endogenous quality and provide experimental 
evidence that the “lemons problem”, rather than driving the market out of existence, may lead 
to a more intense exchange of very low quality products.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In Akerlof’s (1970) words, “The presence of people in the market who are willing to offer 
inferior goods tends to drive the market out of existence” (p. 495). The original framework 
assumes that quality is not observable by buyers before a product is purchased. Some early 
experiments by Holt and Sherman (1999) have replicated the basic lemons story in the 
classroom. Later, several authors have addressed reputation-related mechanisms which 
mitigate the lemons problem in a variety of local
1
, online
2
 and laboratory
3
 markets. However, 
in many real world examples, the appearance of low quality products is associated with 
intense rather than scarce trade. For example, in many western countries, the entry of low 
quality products from China has been associated with increased consumption. Also, the 
tradition of car-boot exchange markets in many countries involves intense trade of rather 
low-quality products. We argue that in the case in which the quality of the products is a result 
of traders’ choice and the information asymmetry regarding product quality affects both sides 
of the market, the existence of very low quality products enhances trade, rather than being 
detrimental to it as predicted by Akerlof (1970). 
As suggested in the aforementioned quotation from Akerlof’s (1970) seminal paper, we 
consider a more general framework, in which sellers decide on how much quality to embody 
in the goods they trade facing a quality-contingent unit cost. Furthermore, we assume that 
agents on both sides of the market possess an informational advantage regarding the quality 
of their own products. An interesting example could be a two-sided version of the 
information and evaluation markets described by Avery et al. (1999). Another case which can 
be described as a two-sided lemons market with endogenous quality is that of international 
currency markets, where countries may trade high volumes of low-value currencies. To our 
knowledge, the case in which agents on both sides of the market know the quality of their 
own product but ignore the quality of products offered by others has not been studied so far. 
Furthermore, there has been no analysis of the case in which agents can actually decide on 
the quality of the goods they are willing to exchange in the market.  
An important feature of our framework is that, rather than sellers and buyers, there are two 
types of agents exchanging their goods in the market, as formalized in the seminal papers by 
Shubik (1973) and Shapley and Shubik (1977). In such market games, agents with different 
preferences and endowments individually decide on the quantity of the good they want to 
exchange, while the relative price of products is determined by their relative scarcity. We 
consider such a game, extending the framework to the endogenous quality case, allowing 
agents to decide not only on the quantity but also on the quality of the products they wish to 
exchange for the other product available in the market. Like in the original framework, 
individual traders receive shares of the other product available for exchange proportional to 
their contribution to the total output of their product type. With fixed qualities, such markets 
resemble perfect competition, when the number of players is sufficiently large
4
. Nash 
equilibria with trade usually coexist with a Pareto inferior zero-trade equilibrium. Duffy et al. 
(2011) show that agents systematically avoid such an equilibrium, whereas Barreda-
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 Greif (1989, 1993). 
2
 See Houser and Wooders (2006). 
3
 Yamagishi and Matsuda (2002). 
4
 See Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1978) and Koutsougeras (2009). 
Tarrazona et al. (2015) observe intense exchange even in the absence of a Nash equilibrium 
with trade. Furthermore, Barreda-Tarrazona et al. (2015) have shown that intense trade and 
low quality are simultaneously observed in exchange markets with endogenous quality. 
However, our design establishes that the endogenous low quality of the products exchanged 
in the market actually enhances trade as compared to the exogenous quality case which is 
adopted here as the benchmark.  
2. The market game 
We outline first the theoretical framework introduced by Barreda-Tarrazona, et al. (2015). 
The exchange economy consists of two goods yx,  and n  agents, divided into two types. 
Agent i ( j ) of type I  ( II ) possesses w  units of good x  (y) and zero units of good y (x). 
Preferences are described by the utility function yxyxu  ),(  for type I agents and by 
yxyxv ),(  for type II agents, with 10   . 
Agents individually submit quality and quantity bids in a single market. That is, each type I  
(II) agent can offer an amount ],0[ wqi   ( ],0[ wq j  ) of good x  ( y ) of quality ]1,0[ia  (
]1,0[ja ) in exchange for good y ( x ). Hence, the action sets for agents are
}0,10|),{( 2 wqaqaS hhhhh   . In our setup, the higher the selected quality the 
higher the cost for the supplier and the higher the utility for the consumers (i.e., active traders 
of the other type). The average qualities of the two goods offered for exchange are quantity-
weighted and are defined as iiiiiI qqaa  /  for good x and jjjjjII qqaa  /  for good y . 
Given a profile of quality-quantity bids, the relative price of good y  is 


 


otherwise,0
0, if/ jjiijjii qqqq
p  
the final allocation of goods is )/,(),( pqaqawyx iIIiiii   for type I  agents and 
),(),( jjjIjj qawpqayx   for a type II  agents, where divisions over zero are equal to zero 
whenever they appear in the above expressions. 
We define an equilibrium as a Nash equilibrium in quality-quantity bid strategies and we 
demonstrate that there exists no equilibrium in which an agent submits a pair of positive 
quality and quantity bids. 
Proposition Any equilibrium requires 0 hhqa  for all agents h  of both types. 
Proof We start with the case where all agents submit zero quality bids and/or zero quantity 
bids. Then, the best response of an individual will definitely involve 0 hhqa , because any 
pair of positive bids leads to lower utility than the consumption of her initial endowment. We 
now move on to the case where we have a strategy profile that leads to active trading and let 
us select an agent (of any type) who submitted positive quantity bids. Given that this agent 
faces a maximisation problem with direct restriction on variables, partial differentiation of the 
objective function with respect to the quality variable always yields negative sign and hence 
any solution requires zero quality. That is, the best response for this agent involves zero 
quality. Consequently there is no equilibrium featuring an agent who submits a pair of 
positive quality and quantity bids. ■  
Following this result, it is easily understood that all equilibria of the game involve zero 
exchanges, resulting in agents enjoying their initial utility.  
Corollary In equilibrium, all type I agents consume )0,(),( wyx ii 
 , all type II agents 
consume  ),0(),( wyx jj 
  and all agents of both types enjoy utility wyxvyxu   ),(),( .  
3. An experiment 
The experiment took place between December 2014 and July 2015 at the LEE, Universitat 
Jaume I (Castellón) and at the LINEEX, University of Valencia. A total of 104 students from 
business and economics-related subjects were recruited following the standard online 
protocol. They were randomly assigned to two treatments, a baseline one with Exogenous 
Quality (48 subjects) and one with Endogenous Quality (56 subjects). In each session, they 
were divided into 6 (Exogenous Quality) and 7 (Endogenous Quality) independent matching 
groups respectively, each containing 8 players (4 of each type). In each period, 4 subjects 
(two of each type) were matched to form two markets per group.  
At the beginning of each period, each subject was endowed with 20 units of a good whose 
unit consumption yields the owner 𝛽 =0.6 units of utility, whereas the same good, at 
maximal quality, yields 1 unit of utility to the other type of player. This case is implemented 
in the Exogenous Quality treatment. Following Cordella and Gabszewicz (1998) under 
maximal quality, Barreda-Tarrazona et al. (2015) observe that, for these values, it is 
collectively beneficial to engage in full trade, while the non-cooperative equilibrium involves 
minimal or zero trade. In the Endogenous Quality case, our framework unambiguously 
predicts either zero quality or minimal quantity trade or both in equilibrium, while full trade-
full quality bids by all traders maximize welfare.  
In each period (T=1-40), subjects simultaneously submit quantity (integers from 0, 1,…, 20) 
and –in the Endogenous Quality treatment– quality (from 0, 0.1, 0.2,…,1.0) bids. The 
experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). A profit calculator and a 
payoff table contingent on others’ strategies was provided to the subjects to help them to 
accurately predict the consequences of their strategies for different strategies of their 
opponents
5
. Feedback was received on own and other’s strategies and results from the market 
a subject had just participated in. The average duration of a session was approximately 100 
minutes and average earnings were approximately 17.5€ per subject in the Exogenous 
Quality treatment and 13€ per subject in the Endogenous Quality treatment.  
In Table 1, we provide descriptive statistics for quality and quantity bids throughout the 
experiment and for the initial and final 5 periods of the session. Whereas the zero- or 
minimal-trade prediction is strongly rejected by the significant amounts of trade observed, 
(mean 13.36, median 14 in the Exogenous Quality treatment; mean 16.30, median 20 in the 
Endogenous Quality treatment), the qualities chosen in the endogenous case are close to zero 
(mean 0.089, median 0 throughout the session). In Figures 1 and 2, we compare treatments 
with respect to the distribution of quantity bids pooled across all periods and matching 
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 Instructions and experimental data can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
groups. A high concentration of bids is observed on the maximum amount of 20, when 
quality is endogenous, which is the main finding of our experiment. Clearly, in the 
Endogenous Quality treatment, trade is much more intense than in the Exogenous Quality 
treatment. Specifically, in the Exogenous Quality Treatment, 12.03% of all the quantity bids 
are exactly 20 units, coinciding with the collectively optimal, maximal trade bids, whereas in 
the Endogenous Quality treatment, 68.26% of all the quantity bids are exactly 20 units. 
However, this comes at the cost of very low or zero quality. Specifically, in the Endogenous 
Quality treatment 78.93% of all quality bids are 0. In the last 5 periods of the experiment, 
these percentages become 29.17% (maximal trade in the Exogenous Quality treatment), 
86.43% (maximal trade in the Endogenous Quality treatment) and 96.79% (zero quality in the 
Endogenous Quality treatment), respectively. In the Endogenous Quality treatment, 85.36% 
of the bids in the last 5 periods involve both maximum trade and zero quality. In the 
Exogenous Quality treatment the mean quantity traded in the last 5 periods is 15.84 (rising 
from 10.13 in the initial 5 rounds), whereas in the Endogenous Quality treatment, the mean 
quantity traded in the last 5 periods is 18.28 (rising from 11.28 in the initial 5 rounds) with 
the median rising from 10 units in the first 5 periods to 20 in the last 5 periods and throughout 
the experiment. In the Endogenous Quality treatment, average quality falls from 0.32 in the 
beginning to 0.016 towards the end of the session, while the median falls from 0.2 to 0, which 
is also the median quality throughout the experiment.  
Figures 3 and 4 show the evolution of median quantity, the former, and quality, the latter, 
bids over the 40 periods of the experiment. On one hand, in the Endogenous Quality 
treatment, before period 10, the median behaviour stabilizes to full (20 units) trade and zero 
quality. On the contrary, in the Exogenous Quality treatment, median quantity exhibits an 
increasing trend closer to full trade, without coinciding with it, even after 40 periods. On 
Figures 5, 6 and 7, a similar pattern can be observed for each independent matching group. In 
the Exogenous Quality treatment, all groups exhibit an increasing trend of quantity bids, 
whereas in matching groups of the Endogenous Quality treatment, median behaviour evolves 
fast to stabilize over the largest part of the session on the zero quality-full trade combination.  
Figure 8 shows that the social dilemma emerging in the exchange market considered here is 
overcome by human subjects only in the Exogenous Quality treatment, in which increasingly 
intense trade gradually leads to significantly higher utility levels than those of the initial 
endowment. This is also confirmed for each one of the independent matching groups. On the 
contrary, the non-cooperative equilibrium prediction regarding final utility levels is strongly 
confirmed in the Endogenous Quality treatment. 
Figures 9 and 10 show a striking coincidence between the theory and observed behaviour in 
the case of the Endogenous Quality treatment. After the initial periods, the median post-trade 
utility in each group converges exactly to 12, which is the initial, pre-trade utility. This is 
predicted by the corollary of our theory, confirming the intuitively appealing property that, in 
equilibrium, decision makers do not end up worse off than in the initial endowment. This is 
not the case with the exogenous quality treatment, in which subjects gradually learn how to 
substantially increase their overall utility above the initial endowment levels. 
Finally, in the Endogenous Quality treatment, quality and quantity bids exhibit a strong 
negative correlation (independence strongly rejected in all cases, p=0.000) in all the sub-
periods considered (Spearman's rho =-.5645 in periods 31-40; -.3322 in periods 1-10; -.5322 
in the entire session). This is another way to confirm our finding that in the Endogenous 
Quality framework, the so called “lemons problem” enhances rather than restricts trade. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
In many modern economies, a common pattern of trade seems to link high volumes of trade 
with low quality products. This contradicts the concern inspired by the seminal paper of 
Akerlof (1970) that the existence of sufficiently many low quality products in a market may 
drive the market out of existence. We consider a two-sided extension of that seminal model, 
assuming that the information asymmetry regarding the quality of traded products does not 
imply an advantage in favour of one type of agent. Furthermore, we consider the case of 
endogenous quality, relaxing the assumption that the quality of “lemons” is exogenously 
given. In this two-sided, endogenous quality version of the market for lemons, the prevalence 
of low quality products leads to unprecedented levels of trade.  
It has been known for years that, thanks to a variety of reasons, people overcome social 
dilemmas generated by divergent individual and collective goals. This has led to a fruitful 
empirical agenda obtaining positive contributions to public good games, cooperation in 
prisoner dilemmas, trust, altruistic donations, etc. Likewise, agents in our market game 
engage in more trade than predicted by the Nash equilibrium. We focus on the largely 
ignored interplay between quantity and quality strategies. We provide theory based on market 
games in which agents will either provide too little quantity or too low quality to the market. 
Our results inspire optimism on the ability of agents to overcome the social dilemma in terms 
of trade volumes, but not in terms of product quality. Hopefully, the pattern of high-
volume/low-quality trade reported here will inspire more research from both a theoretical and 
an empirical point of view.       
5. Appendix: Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
  
QUALITY (Only 
Endogenous case) 
QUANTITY (Endogenous 
Quality) 
QUANTITY (Exogenous Quality) 
Median Mean St.  Dev. Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St. Dev. 
Periods 1-40 0 0.09 0.234 20 16.306 6.595 14 13.361 4.435 
Periods 1-5 0 0.323 0.31 10 11.289 6.509 10 10.125 4.466 
Periods 36-
40 
0 0.016 0.113 20 18.282 5.138 17 15.838 4.437 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of quality and quantity bids  
  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Quantity bids by treatment 
 
  
  
Figure 2: Boxplot of quantity by treatment 
  
  
Figure 3: Evolution of median quantity bid by period and by treatment 
  
 Figure 4: Evolution of median quality bid in the Endogenous Quality treatment  
 
  
 Figure 5: Evolution of the median quantity bid in the Exogenous Quality treatment by 
matching group 
 
 
 Figure 6: Evolution of the median quantity bid in the Endogenous Quality treatment by 
matching group 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Figure 7: Evolution of the median quality bid in the Endogenous Quality treatment by 
matching group 
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Figure 8: Evolution of median utility by treatment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 9: Evolution of median utility in the Exogenous Quality treatment by matching group 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Evolution of median utility in the Endogenous Quality treatment by independent 
matching group. (“Corollary … all agents … enjoy utility wyxvyxu   ),(),( .”) 
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